I received an uncorrected proof advance review copy of this from the publisher through Edelweiss。 In it， ADM Stavridis has curated nine difficult Navy-centric decisions that made - or broke - careers。 These are obviously not normal decisions。 There are the legendary torpedo-damning types of Jones， Farragut， Decatur; the selfless in-the-heat-of-the-moment decision of Dorie Miller in Pearl Harbor; the brash and reckless， flawed ， if tangentially successful decisions of “Bull” Halsey; the calculate I received an uncorrected proof advance review copy of this from the publisher through Edelweiss。 In it， ADM Stavridis has curated nine difficult Navy-centric decisions that made - or broke - careers。 These are obviously not normal decisions。 There are the legendary torpedo-damning types of Jones， Farragut， Decatur; the selfless in-the-heat-of-the-moment decision of Dorie Miller in Pearl Harbor; the brash and reckless， flawed ， if tangentially successful decisions of “Bull” Halsey; the calculated risks of Dewey in the Philippines and RADM Howard’s captain Phillips rescue; and the tragic crew-saving but against “tradition” situations faced by Bucher off of North Korea， and Crozier with a raging pandemic on his ship。 Stavridis says “…in today’s Navy， we ask our leaders to grapple with unimaginably difficult decisions， often in the crucible of battle。” and there are lessons throughout both in the decisions he’s addressing， and in his astute analyses。 He speculates at what may or may not have been going through the heads of his examples。 “None of the leaders I have mentioned were perfect decision-makers—no one ever is， of course—but I learned from each of them and some of their ideas have made their way into this book。”In the Strait of Hormuz in the mid-1980s， Stavridis， in the crosshairs of Iran radar and weapons fire-control， knowing the rules of engagement， saidThe decision-making was excruciating， and again， the mindset had to be one part steady on the trigger， and he other part ready to lunge for the firing key。 How do you balance those things？ For me， it was something I learned from the senior captains I worked for - forcing time to slow down。 The best military decision-makers have the ability to swiftly synthesize sensor data from radars， sonars， and communications nets; mentally check it against the intelligence from the vast US surveillance system; correlate the threat; discern the intentions of the enemy; and act decisively either in suppressing fire or release batteries This is not limited to combat decisions。 I know I’ve unnerved some when after quickly going around the table with my “What do you think？” question， I have enough information to make a decision。 Not anywhere in the same realm as combat decisions， but the same skill set cultivated from my early training as a nuclear reactor operator where sometimes specific immediate actions must be taken following rapid assessment of multiple data streams。 Stavridis follows， “Decision-making it hard to begin with at sea - it’s vastly harder if you become emotionally cluttered。” Further， “Learning how to telegraph success， using optimism as a force-multiplier in decision-making， and knowing when to ‘find the exit’ are all key themes that echo through these choices。”And in his conclusion， he describes the key elements that help in the critical decision-making， which I will only list here: Gather all the intelligence; Understand the timeline; Methodically consider the possible outcomes of your decision—both good and bad; Evaluate the resources; Focus on your people—but don’t be paralyzed with fear over their well-being; Don’t get emotionally involved in people who are roadblocks; [okay， one editorial… this is important:] Be willing to change your mind; Be determined; and Be prepared to execute。Selected observations and thoughts: On Stephen Decatur， having been incredibly successful， daring， and receiving of high praise， and having once offered an oft-quoted， if likely paraphrased toast “Our country - in her intercourse with foreign nations， may she always be in the right， and always successful， right or wrong。”: And yet， given his untimely and much-mourned end [a duel， under conditions that would have been foolhardy even in that day]， it is also worth drawing a cautionary lesson from his character。 No one has ever been always in the right and always successful， and points of pride have tripped up many talented and ambitious people， ending many glittering careers。Stavridis concludes that despite the risks Decatur took， he was able to find a balance。 Stavradis recalls touring Afghanistan at NATO commander and seeing again and again in the faces of the young soldiers， Marines， sailors and airmen there “the audacity of a young Decatur”， and thinking “my job， as a vastly superior officer， was to temper that keen sense of personal bravery， and focus the chain of command on the need for the balance of planning and the grounding in higher values of the institution that must be observed and enforced。”On David Farragut’s post-Mobile Bay account praising his ships and crews （and demurring credit to himself）No leader of people， no matter how brave， can truly go it alone， and Farragut’s reporting style makes clear he had earned the trust and eager followership of those who served with him。 Highlighting his crews’ dedicated devotion rather than puffing up his own decisiveness was typical of Farragut and showed that he well understood the importance of organizational execution based on truest earned over time。 Having skin in the game not only raises the acuity of a desk ion-maker， but also inspires his teammates。 Dorie Miller bravery:When faced with a circumstance where he could have kept himself safe while still serving in his role， Miller instead made a tougher， nobler choice。 He rose above the barriers that society had placed in front of him， and put himself in harm’s way for our country。 We should give the highest honors to the people who make decisions like Dorie Miller。 That is a legacy unfulfilled， and a worthy goal for our Navy to seek。 Stavridis says， “Of all the choices in this book， I think Pete Bucher drew the worst hand of cards， and for the rest of his life he had to constantly defend his decision。 The traditions of the Navy never ceased to weigh on him， and after he retired （as a full commander， about where he probably would have ended his career even absent the Pueblo incident） he continued to feel unjustly accused and unfairly judged by many。” My grandmother had my grandfather’s copy of Bucher’s memoir on a shelf， and I remember starting to read it when I was a teen， but I didn’t get far。 “Bucher’s decision-making throughout was constrained by decisions made long before the Pueblo ever got close to North Korea。” And Choices need to be made on the merits of the moment， with an open and innovative mind。 Pete Bucher did not make his choice out of cowardice; he made a painful cost-benefit calculation that resistance would waste lives and not protect the national secrets on his ship。 Butcher’s decision protected his crew and ultimately served the interests of the nation by destroying as much classified material as possible before the Peublo was boarded - just as Bucher knew it would be when the North Koreans cut off all possible escape routes。 After a great deal of thought， I’ve concluded that condemning eighty young men to die for the pride of the Navy would not have made him a hero; it would have made him a modern Ahab， obsessed with self-destruction。 Stavridis continues with an obvious， if unfortunately not always followed， observation The lessons of Bucher’s decision echo in every category of human activity， military， or otherwise。 Relying on established practice is a comfortable thing to do。 It simplifies decision-making and establishes a sense of order in a chaotic universe。 Indeed， large organizations need structure refined over time by learning best practices。 But leaving those traditions unexamined for a long time leads to ossified thinking。 Organizations need to be in a constant state of keeping what works and removing what does not。 Failing to do so is worse than laziness; it is an abdication of leadership。 This is the essence - many organizations do make the attempt to see what new ideas can be applied， but that failing to remove what does not work？ Less of an imperative。 RADM Howard and the Captain Phillips Maersk Alabama hostage rescue:In order to do her job effectively， she had to let everyone else do theirs - doubly difficult in the complex， stressful， and high-stakes setting of a hostage crisis。 Once the president authorized the use of lethal for e， responsibility fell to her as the senior commander on the scene to decide when and how to apply the force at her disposal。 By authorizing the SEALs to shoot， she was delegating that authority at least two levels down - to Commander Castellano [CO of the Bainbridge]， who with eyes on the lifeboat， would judge the threat to the captain， and to the SEAL snipers， whose split-second execution would result in either a “perfect op” or the devastating loss of a hostage and deep public embarrassment。Admiral Howard knew she would be responsible， and as in all commands， responsible even for things she couldn’t directly control。 All the more amazing considering she had been in command of the Combined Task Force only a week when this unfolded。 And CAPT Brett Crozier， who was caught in a political and pandemic nightmare: “He must have known his career would suffer terribly and probably fatally—and it did， resulting in his ‘relief for cause’ （the Navy’s version of firing someone in command。）[…] Yet he chose to put the welfare of his crew above his own career ambitions， precisely what the Navy would want of our sea captains。” I served on two aircraft carriers - they’re huge， and yet， as Stavridis notes， the people spaces… are not: “being on a Navy ship is one of the worst places to combat a virus like COVID-19。 These tightly packed conditions weighed on Crozier as he evaluated his options。” Stavridis knows Crozier personally and professionally; “Brett Crozier is a thoughtful， methodical planner who speaks in articulate and well-constructed paragraphs。 He is a long way from an impulsive Halsey， and someone who thinks through his actions and comments。 […] Brett Crozier held a very bad hand of cards as he made his choice。 He knew his “red flare” would risk it all in the context of his career—but he chose the health of his crew over anything else。” He says When I ask myself what I would have done differently， the short answer is not much。 I， too， would have recognized the lack of information， the press of time， the glare of publicity， the poor job the Navy chain of command was doing， and that I was facing a clear career-ending moment。 [And on the unfortunately political response…] But firing and publicly humiliating him is overkill， and hurts him， of course， but hurts the Navy as well。 It sends a bad signal to other Commanding Officers。 I think it was a mistake on the part of the Navy， on balance。 。。。more